Ied Manual 2015
Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) became the signature threat of both the Afghan and Iraq wars. In Afghanistan they have been responsible for around 50 percent of all ISAF coalition troops killed in combat. Ironically, the concept, as well as the processing instructions to manufacture the deadly devices were provided to the insurgents by the US military themselves in the first place. The US Army Technical Manual, TM 31-210 The Improvised Munitions Handbook (Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs), Department of the Army, 1969 - original publication; 2007 - electronic edition reads like a sales pitch to insurgent wannabes on the potentiality, scope and benefits of the device. Quoting from the Introduction:.
In Unconventional Warfare operations it may be impossible or unwise to use conventional military munitions as tools in the conduct of certain missions. It may be necessary instead to fabricate the required munitions from locally available or unassuming materials. The purpose of this manual is to increase the potential of Special Forces and guerrilla troops by describing in detail the manufacture of munitions from seemingly innocuous locally available materials. Manufactured, precision devices almost always will be more effective, more reliable, and easier to use than improvised ones, but shelf items will just not be available for certain operations for security or logistical reasons. Therefore the operator will have to rely on materials he can buy in a drug or paint store, find in a junk pile, or scrounge from military stocks. Also, many of the ingredients and materials used in fabricating homemade items are so commonplace or innocuous they can be carried without arousing suspicion. The completed item itself often is more easily concealed or camouflaged.
In addition, the field expedient item can be tailored for the intended target, thereby providing an advantage over the standard item in flexibility and versatility.(.)These items were found to be effective in most environments. IEDs can take the form of suicide bombs, such as Personal-Borne IEDs (PB-IED), Radio-Controlled IEDs (RC-IEDs), Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VB-IEDs), Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (SV-IED), Command-Wire IEDs (CW-IEDs), Victim-Operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), and Pressure-Plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). First used at a large scale in the Iraq war, IEDs soon became a favorite insurgent weapon in Iraq and Afghanistan causing dread, havoc and panic amongst US and coalition forces. IEDs became the object of a momentous cat-and-mouse game between innovative insurgents, continuously tinkering with their artifacts to improve detection avoidance and enhance harming potential, while the U.S. Kept trying to counter the problem by throwing billions of US dollars thereupon, in an attempt to concoct adequate armor for military vehicles, efficient sensing devices for early detection, and other defense paraphernalia.
IEDs toiled the ground for such swindlers as the suppliers of the infamous fake bomb detector, who sold their dowsing rod to 20 countries in the Middle East and Far East, including Iraq and Afghanistan, for as much as USD 60,000 each. The Iraqi government is said to have spent USD 85 million on the devices.
This paper presents an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) brigade level behavior during the Northern Ireland Conflict (1970-1998) and identifies the organizational factors that impact a brigade's lethality as measured via terrorist attacks. Key independent variables include levels of technical expertise, cadre age, counter-terrorism policies experienced, brigade size, and IED components and delivery methods. We find that technical expertise within a brigade allows for careful IED usage, which significantly minimizes civilian casualties (a specific strategic goal of PIRA) while increasing the ability to kill more high value targets with IEDs. Lethal counter-terrorism events also significantly affect a brigade's likelihood of killing both civilians and high-value targets but in different ways.
Killing PIRA members significantly decreases IED fatalities but also significantly decreases the possibility of zero civilian IED-related deaths in a given year. Killing innocent Catholics in a Brigade's county significantly increases total and civilian IED fatalities.
Together the results suggest the necessity to analyze dynamic situational variables that impact terrorist group behavior at the sub-unit level. There is substantial evidence that, on average, terrorist organizations that are more capable and have more access to resources and information will be more lethal. Conversely, those that lack such abilities are likely to perform less well when they try to kill (;, ). These generalizations, while true for the aggregate, obscure the fact that different organizations do not always use their expertise to kill. Terrorist organizations engage in a wide variety of functional behaviors, not all of which are directly related to efforts to kill or cause destruction. Some organizations specifically plan attacks so that they are likely to kill no one (;; ). To effectively identify what specific factors affect organizational strategies, it is important to look inside organizations and identify those factors that push a specific organization to be lethal, not to be lethal, and perhaps most importantly to be selectively lethal.
While there is a great deal of case study research on terrorist organizations, most of this work is qualitative in nature and is focused on situational factors that limit generalization (;; ). Another key limitation of the current literature is a tremendous focus in the last decade on Islamist organizations (;;;;;,; ). While the Islamist terrorist threat is an important and obvious current concern, it is not the only type of ideology associated with terrorism. Also, the religious ideology that drives Islamist political violence is likely to create different factors that affect the lethality of the organizations under investigation.
Specifically, Asal and Rethemeyer found that religious organizations are much more likely to be lethal than nonreligious organizations—which during the period they study is referring primarily to Islamist organizations (; ) and that certain other organizations (like environmental organizations) actively try to avoid killing. In addition to broadening the literature beyond a focus on Islamist terrorism, our efforts to examine the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) specifically allow us to tease out the internal organizational-level factors that moderate or increase the likelihood that an organization will be lethal, how lethal they will be, and who they are likely to target. The ability to gain some traction on the choice of targets—be they military or civilian—is also important given the divergence in the literature that exists on what terrorism actually means and how violent organizations differ (;; ).
There is a huge normative argument about the utility of the term terrorist organization and how it should be applied (; ), with some saying the term is pointless (or used to normatively to delegitimize your opponents), while others see it as a powerful normative tool to identify those that are purposively targeting civilians on purpose (; ). Although the normative aspect of targeting is not the primary focus of our research here, our analysis does allow us to shed some light (within one organization at least) on factors that impact how an organization makes targeting choices. Our effort here is to disaggregate the efforts of one terrorist organization, PIRA, across geographic operational domains. We focus specifically at the factors that make improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and shooting attacks more or less lethal within a given geographic territory within a given year.
IED types, brigade experience, size, and experiences of counterterrorism (CT) should all have an effect, but we believe the impact of these explanatory variables will differ in important ways. Although structural aspects (such as ideology) of a conflict matter, explanations of a terrorist organization’s lethality rates at the local level are rooted in dynamic situational variables. Through understanding which types of dynamic variables matter, it may provide policy makers and practitioners with an empirically informed understanding of what environmental factors influence the tempo and trajectory of violent terrorist campaigns and what subunit traits matter for threat assessments at the group level.
However, we should also note at the outset the advantages and disadvantages of our particular focus on PIRA activity. By focusing on one specific organization over an extended time, we were able to gather a great deal of quantitative intraorganizational data that we were able to use to tease out the relative importance of organizational capabilities and the organizational action/state reaction cycle. At the same time, it is important to be modest in our claims: this analysis is for only one organization (prominent as it has been in the history of twentieth-century terrorism), and thus, we need to be careful drawing conclusions that are too broad in scope. We see this analysis as a first quantitative step in better understanding the internal factors that impact an organization’s lethality across space and time. PIRA IED events across time. Note: PIRA = Provisional Irish Republican Army; IED = improvised explosive device.
The remaining figures in this section disaggregate PIRA’s campaign into five discrete phases of activity. Our intention is to illustrate how organizational changes in structure and strategy impact the trajectory of violent events, types of events typically engaged upon, and their outcomes. Icnd1 v2.0 exam. The first phase is from 1969 to 1976.
During this period, PIRA structured themselves like an army composed of various brigades, battalions, and companies. Each unit was responsible for specific geographical areas of operation, both combat and noncombat related. Indiscriminate violence by both sides of the conflict marked this period, the most defining moment being “Bloody Sunday” when the British Army shot and killed thirteen innocent civil rights marchers. This was an unprecedented propaganda coup for PIRA and led to mass recruitment and mobilization. Civilian fatalities attributed to PIRA also peaked during this phase and included the events of “Bloody Friday” where, in under two hours, 22 IEDs killed 9 (6 civilians, 2 British Soldiers, and 1 Ulster Defence Association member) and injured a further 130. The second phase, from 1977 to 1980, is significant for a number of reasons.
First, there was a large-scale reorganization of PIRA’s structure to a tighter cellular based network in which cells acted independently of one another. This change placed far less emphasis on the quantity of volunteers and far more emphasis on secrecy and discipline. Almost instantly, the effects of the structural changes were noticeable. Four hundred sixty-five fewer charges for paramilitary offences occurred within a year (, 145). Second, a number of leadership changes occurred whereby younger Northern born-and-bred members (such as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness) became PIRA chiefs of staff in the late 1970s (, 513). The third phase covered the period from 1981 to 1989 and encompasses the growing politicization of the Republican movement that occurred after the Hunger Strikes. In total, ten Republicans died during hunger strikes in 1981; seven were PIRA members.
Additionally, PIRA’s Bobby Sands was elected to Westminster after winning a by-election while on a hunger strike. Sympathy for PIRA began to rise again, and this was largely channeled toward PIRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, by organizational elites. Phase 4 (1990–1994) includes the negotiations and pathway toward ceasefires undertaken secretly by organizational elites. Much of this was carried on unbeknownst to the wider cadre. Phase 5 (1995–1998) incorporates the period in which the negotiations were made public and the march toward the final ceasefire and Good Friday Agreement that symbolized for many the end of the Northern Ireland conflict. Neatly illustrates the substantial drop in the numbers of fatalities and injuries through PIRA’s IED activity across time. Phase 1 averages 70.57 fatalities a year, while the figures for phases 2 through 5 are 28, 32.5, 20.8, and 4.125, respectively.
Theory One of the major findings in the quantitative analysis of the lethality of terrorist organizations is that organizational factors do indeed matter. Asal and Rethemeyer found that organizational size, connections, and ideology all had a significant impact on the lethality of terrorist organizations. However, their analysis reflects an aggregate cross-organizational perspective focusing upon a wide array of ideologies and does not take differences in tactics into account. What may be true of organizations in the aggregate may not be true if we disaggregate organizations. One confounding factor may be that ideological differences hide important differences at the suborganizational level., 53) notes that ideology relates to targeting practices of terrorist organizations because “it sets out the moral framework within which they operate.” Similarly, a number of scholars note that the “new terrorist” organizations are more lethal and attribute this difference in lethality to religious ideology: religious ideologies are in some cases “more permissive of violent and deadly acts”.
Further, 438) argue that two factors shape how intrinsically linked any ideology is to deadliness. The first point relates to whether the organization’s audience is earthly or supernatural. The second point relates to an organization’s ability to “clearly and cleanly define an ‘other.’” Ideology, however, cannot explain divergences in lethality within a single organization.
Within a terrorist organization, the ideology’s audience and ability to “other” the enemy remain relatively constant (although it must be stated that components of PIRA were more sectarian than others while some politicized earlier than others). The same is true for other variables often labeled “root causes” of terrorism, such as rates of democracy and state sponsorship. The reasons for varying rates of lethality within an organization must lay elsewhere.
Our contention is that subunit capability (conceptualized as unit size, levels of professional training, and experience) and blue team (e.g., those actors charged with countering terrorism such as the military or police) activity combine to make particular forms of fatal violence more likely within particular components of a terrorist organization. When Smarter Is Better than Bigger: Human Capital The social movement literature has long established that resources are key to the success of organizations and the lack of resources has been seen to limit what terrorist organizations can do.
Human capital is often depicted as the key resource (; ). Jackson points out that larger terrorist organizations should be better at adopting and making effective use of new technologies. All else being equal we would expect larger organizations to be more lethal. Contrary to ), 69-72) makes the case that when it comes to carrying out attacks, larger organizational structures are likely to be less effective because they require resources to maintain them. Makes a similar argument about the tensions between an organization trying to protect itself while still trying to carry out its attacks. These arguments treat terrorist organizations as single entities and do not examine them as coexisting subunits.
Ied Manual
While we can measure terrorist attack counts by whole organizations, if the organization is big enough it is misleading to say that an attack is conducted by an entire organization. Thus, when we look at a terrorist organization’s component parts the logic may be different than for the organization as a whole. In the case of PIRA, attacks were carried out by different brigades (who themselves had specialized roles and responsibilities) and rarely as attacks orchestrated by the organization as a whole. Indeed, PIRA’s claims of responsibility often attributed attacks to particular brigades or battalions. Another possibility to consider is that the size of an organizational component will have a differential impact depending on the type of attack that is carried out. The level of expertise that a type of attack demands should have an impact on how human resources impact the success of that kind of attack (, 12-13).
The level of technical expertise needed for an average shooting attack for example could be considered low—so the impact of having more people with technical skills should be minimal. On the other hand, complex attacks demand a higher level of organization, expertise, and security (if you assume that complex attacks have the potential to be more spectacular in their consequences;,;, 12-13). Firsthand accounts of PIRA training suggest that a disproportionate amount of time was spent on IED training compared to shooting (see ), which leads us to suggest that IEDs are generally more complex than shooting attacks and their successful execution depends more on knowledge at the individual bomb maker and his or her network affiliates’ level. Further to this, illustrate that IED attacks form tighter space-time clusters than do non-IED events, which indicates that IED attacks involve more planning, training, materials, expertise, and local support.
Knowledge at the individual level, rather than group size, may therefore be a more important factor for determining the effectiveness of IEDs compared to shooting attacks. In fact, complex attacks have the potential to be more spectacular in their consequences, and certainly are more likely to portray the group responsible as more sophisticated with the ability to coordinate multiple, simultaneous efforts. However, group size also matters.
On one hand, the larger the group, the more likely a group is to have in its ranks an individual with the requisite knowledge to build a sophisticated IED. On the other hand, larger groups are more likely to leak information to counterterrorism agencies and thus increase the chances of early detection. On balance, we believe the relationship is likely to be in favor of larger groups: larger groups contain more knowledge, and more knowledge leads to greater success.
Thus, group size and total knowledge should be related positively to one another from this perspective. Separate from the knowledge argument is one based in experience. Have found that lack of experience reduces lethality in their cross-national study, as has; though Jackson used the age of the organization as a proxy). As, 25) argues, “An almost Darwinian principle of natural selectionseems to affect terrorist organizations, whereby every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessorsTerrorists often analyze the mistakes made by former comrades who have been killed or apprehended.” Thus, we expect that having more experienced cadre in a brigade should also allow for an organization to be more effective in its use of IEDs. Given the relative lack of sophistication needed to perpetrate shooting attacks, the same should not hold true for such attacks at the brigade level. Human capital can also be measured in outputs and not just inner traits such as experience and technical expertise. Not all IEDs and their constituent initiation systems are created equally, with some being more difficult than others.
Similarly, not all target types are equal. High-value targets such as military personnel, military infrastructure, police, or politicians are far more target hardened than most areas heavily frequented by civilian populations. While attacks against high-value targets may have a much higher pay off if they succeed, attacks that are easier (in both their deployment and who they target) should be more successful on average (;, ). In other words, when a brigade tries to carry off an attack using a device that is harder to construct the likelihood of success should fall. By the same token, brigades intent on using an IED (as opposed to opting for a shooting attack with multiple offenders) to attack a hardened target are more likely to fail but also need a more sophisticated device to succeed.
Organizational decision makers are therefore constrained when choosing attack types and targets. Having limited resources (i.e., IED components and personnel), decision makers must choose between attacking soft or hard targets using complex or simple IEDs and IED components. Given the relative ease of attacking civilians, simple IEDs are likely to be chosen. Given the relative difficulty of attacking high-value targets, multifaceted IEDs and complex attacks (defined as attacks involved more than one attack type) are more likely to be chosen despite the higher chance of failure. While the most lethal attacks are likely to be complex ones targeting civilians, there are fewer incentives to use such tactics given the fact that simpler means can also cause a great deal of death and destruction against weakly guarded targets. We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:.
The Impact of Counterterrorism Counterterrorism efforts are designed to impact how terrorists behave. Yet, whether and how this precisely happens is often less than clear.
A report from 2006 found that (1) very little rigorous empirical research exists, (2) what does exist provides little support for most common policies, and (3) the one policy that does seem to have an effect works in the wrong direction: retaliatory raids increased terrorism. More recent work focusing on particular cases or surveys of the literature has found either a complicated picture or a nonproductive: counterterrorism activities are ineffective or counterproductive (;; ). An analysis of PIRA terrorism found that most counterterrorist efforts resulted in an increase in terrorist activity and thereby could be characterized by a “backlash” model of counterterrorism. We should note that due to a specific interest in the impact of discriminate (e.g., the killing of PIRA members) versus indiscriminate (e.g., the killing of Catholic noncombatants) violence our focus here is on proactive offensive state attacks and not on other types of repression that are not specifically violent in nature like situational crime prevention measures such as checkpoints and curfews or judicial deterrence measures such as punitive sentencing. ) suggest an important distinction when it comes to counterterrorism.
They found that targeted house demolitions that destroyed the homes of people engaged in suicide terrorism reduced suicide attacks, while house demolitions that were carried out against property not directly associated with the specific suicide attack increased subsequent terrorism. Byman, examining Israel’s policies of targeted killing found that such assassinations reduced the effectiveness of Hamas terrorism against Israel , although others have found no effect. The ) and ) articles both suggest that counterterrorism actions can create a backlash.
Benmelech et al. And Byman’s articles introduce an interesting and potentially very important caveat. While we can assume that both kinds of attacks are likely to hurt the brigade, indiscriminate attacks compensate for this pain by making the group more popular and creating more support. ) argue that this is exactly one of the reasons why terrorist organizations stage attacks: attacks provoke repression and make terrorist organizations more popular and stronger—something they label Jujitsu Politics (a term first coined by in the context of nonviolent conflict resolution). On the other hand, violence directed specifically at the organization appears to lower the amount of subsequent terrorism. We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:.
Data The data are an aggregation of 5,461 PIRA IED events, all fatal PIRA shootings, and the sociodemographic and operational behaviors of 1,240 PIRA members for the years 1970 to 1998. Similar to many quantitative studies of terrorism and political violence, there exist a number of data constraints in this study. However, after an eighteen-month data collection effort across multiple data sources, we feel that this is the best data available. From a research perspective, focusing upon intraorganizational dynamics allows us to hold constant many of the environmental and systemic variables that may confound other studies.
Army Ied Manual
For this article, PIRA is disaggregated into six discrete subunits, each of which encompasses a county of Northern Ireland. Although not an exact fit to PIRA’s command and functional structure, it acts as the only realizable proxy measure. PIRA was largely structured along geographic lines in a number of ways. First, PIRA was split into two command areas: southern and northern. Northern Command includes both the six counties of Northern Ireland and the border counties of Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, and Monaghan. Northern Command therefore covered the main theater of conflict. In turn, Northern Command was composed of brigadiers, brigades, operations commanders, and active service units of typically four individual PIRA members.
Southern Command constituted the other twenty-one counties of the Republic of Ireland and its duties largely encompassed logistical support for Northern Command activities. Tasks included training, funding, storing, and moving arms as well as provision of safehouses. Often, active service units (ASUs) operated within their own locality (, 20). Interviews with former senior PIRA figures explain why. “Reasons for this would be to avail of local facilities before, during and after operations, such as safehouses where they would be recognized without difficulty, and also because of familiarity with the operational area (a vital aspect of the operational ‘cycle’—target selection, planning, escape routes, etc.). Perhaps, however, this may be seen to have a detrimental effect on the internal security of ASUs—after all, it is far more difficult being required not to know the identity of one’s ASU colleague if, in fact, Volunteers are operating in their ‘own’ locality” (, 22). When questioned what makes a successful member of PIRA, Sean MacStiofain (a former member of PIRA Chief of Staff), noted that “A person has got to be from the locality, right?He’s got to be respected within his own community, right?
So therefore he has the protection of the community. Like he becomes a fish who can swimHe has got to have an intimate knowledge of his—the areas he’s going to operate in. He has got to be considerate about the needs of his own community” (, 107).
The prime location of PIRA violence occurred within the six counties of Northern Ireland. For this study, we aggregated yearly counts of aspects of IED usage, fatal PIRA shooting events, fatal counterterrorism events, and a database of convicted PIRA members for each county. While PIRA’s repertoires of violence also incorporated punishment beatings, kidnappings, and bank robberies, we specifically focus upon aggregate counts of IEDs and shootings because they were the tactics most associated with lethal forms of violence.
In total, there are 174 observations (6 counties × 29 years). Each observation contains yearly counts of the IEDs detonated as intended or were “duds.” We also count the number of each of the following: initiations systems used within a county in a given year: timer-initiated, wire-initiated, remote-initiated, projectile-initiated, booby trap–initiated, impact-initiated, and victim-initiated devices. Counts of the following IED types were also included in the analysis: letter bombs, pipe bombs, grenades, homemade bombs, static munitions, buried IEDs, undervehicle IEDs, car bombs, mortars, and rockets. We also tallied the number of complex IED events. We defined complex IED events as those where the IED was used in conjunction with another types of violent event such as machine gun fire or sniper fire.
Our metric of counterterrorism activity is a count of the PIRA members and innocent Catholics killed by the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It should be noted that these two counts do not reflect the whole counterterrorism picture. Policies such as internment did not directly cause fatalities but caused a later backlash from the Catholic community and ultimately increased PIRA’s ability to recruit new individuals and mobilize mass support. On the other hand, prison-related policy changes such as the withdrawal of the Special Category Status eventually led to the 1981 Hunger Strikes in which seven PIRA and three Irish National Liberation Army members died. When counterterrorism policies indirectly lead to the deaths of PIRA members (such as the Hunger Strikes) these deaths were not counted in our analysis. Other counterterrorism policies and actions such as the use of informants and the capture of bomb-making facilities would also impinge upon PIRA’s ability to engage in lethal IED attacks, but such data were difficult to collect in a systematic way. Our data set included a set of PIRA subunit traits, including a count of members in the Brigade each year; a measure of how big the subunit was in relation to the other five units each year; the mean age of the subunits’ members; the proportion of subunit members who possessed professional skills that could be applied to bomb making; and the number of fatalities the subunit caused through IEDs and shootings across target types (including civilians and high-value targets).
High-value targets encompass a collection of Northern Ireland security forces such as the British Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the Northern Ireland police force), the Ulster Defence Regiment, and the Royal Irish Regiment as well as government officials (both elected and unelected) and other political figures. The aggregate measures for the IED-related variables stem from a newly constructed data set of 5,461 events collected as part of the “From Bomb to Bomb-Maker” project. The data were collected through a mixture of LexisNexis and Irish Times archival stories. The aggregate measures for deaths by the British Army and other counterterrorism forces are collected through McKittrick et al.’s definitive list of war dead from the Northern Ireland conflict. The subunit trait variables were aggregated by brigade from a database of 1,240 individuals who were either convicted of PIRA-related activities (including membership) or died on “active service,” a term used by PIRA to describe a member’s involvement in PIRA-related activities.
For the purposes of the data collection, being engaged in “active service” included both violent activities (e.g. Bombing attacks) and nonviolent activities (e.g., training accidents). The individuals were identified from a number of open sources: (1) statements by PIRA including their annual Roll of Honor, which commemorates their war dead; (2) the Belfast Graves publication that offers an account of Republicans killed in combat; (3) McKittrick et al. Mentioned earlier; and (4) historical accounts of PIRA from academic sources. These names were subsequently coded for a number of sociodemographic, operational, and network variables using the Irish Times archives. Each piece of data (IED event, blue team activity, PIRA militant) was coded twice by separate coders and cross-checked for validity.
Method The unit of analysis is brigade-year. Four dependent variables were studied: total fatalities, civilian fatalities, fatalities among high-value targets (such as security forces, politicians, etc.), and fatalities from shootings. Each dependent variable is a count of the fatalities attributed to each brigade during a year between 1970 and 1998. Given that the dependent variables are counts generated by a rare event—deaths from a terrorist attack—count models were employed. The data have two potential issues that must be accommodated during technique selection: (1) there is evidence of overdispersion of the dependent variable—in all four cases, the mean of the counts is smaller than the standard deviation and (2) the presence of a large number of zeros in the dependent variable (;; ). Problem (1) suggests using a negative binomial model. However, when we modeled the data using a zero-inflated negative binomial technique, the coefficient on α, which captures the overdispersion, was not statistically significant in three of the four models.
In the one case where α was significant, the results were not materially different from those generated by a Poisson model. For simplicity, we have thus used a Poisson distribution for models reported below. With respect to Problem (2), we compared the results from both the standard and the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models. The ZIP model incorporates a two-step decision process into the model assumptions. The decision whether to kill or not is separated (analytically speaking) from the decision regarding how many people to kill.
ZIP allows for the possibility that zeros in the model are present because brigades have chosen not to kill or because they were incapable of executing a fatal attack during a given year. ZIP is attractive precisely because it can accommodate these complexities in the data. In order to verify that the decisions are independent and should be modeled simultaneously but independently, a ) test, which compares the fit of the zero-inflated model to the standard negative binomial regression model, was executed and is reported in the results table. In all four models, the Vuong statistic clearly indicates that a zero-inflated model is superior. In all four models, we attempted to include “phase” and brigade controls to account for panel fixed effects. We also included controls for the mix of device and initiation types used in IEDs over time, which could covary with our key training and age variables.
However, because some types of attacks were highly correlated with brigade, phase, or type of attacks being modeled, the controls could not always be included. Unlike other count models, there is no difference in “exposure”—that is, length of time over which the count would be accumulated—so there are no controls for exposure in these models. Because there are clear reasons to believe there are commonalities across time in the behaviors of brigades, we adjusted the standard errors for brigade-level clustering. The resulting standard errors trade some efficiency for greater robustness. All four models reported χ 2 tests that were statistically significant at p. Conclusion Violent terrorist acts culminate from a process of human social interaction and organization. Often this process begins with underlying systemic causes and is often sustained and driven by more proximate counterterrorism initiatives that feed the recruitment and mobilization of new cadre.
Within the cadre itself, individuals with technical expertise may facilitate particular forms of violence that the group could not engage in absence of this individual. The culmination of a terrorist attack is often preceded by tactical decisions such as who should be targeted, what methods should be used and in the case of an IED attack, what IED type and initiation system would be most effective. All of these processes occur within groups and subgroups of varying sizes and we illustrated that variations across these processes impact a terrorist organization’s deadliness. While the scale and intensity of terrorist campaigns is often related in the literature to distal factors such as rates of poverty, unemployment, and democracy indicators, there remains a distinct lack of awareness that not all violence is equal in terms of the technical proficiency and psychological conditioning needed. Similarly, not all IEDs are equal, and some aspects may drive lethality indicators up or down dependent upon the prevailing strategic orientation of the terrorist group itself. In other words, existing studies tend to aggregate terrorist organizations as collective wholes and treat violent methods and fatality types homogeneously.
Our findings suggest that (1) rates of fatal attacks differ depending upon the type of oppressive counterterrorism policies employed, (2) fatality rates differ intraorganizationally, and finally (3) subunit variables such as membership age, professional technical expertise, and brigade size also affect lethality rates but in different ways dependent upon the type of violence, who is targeted, and the strategic choices the organization makes corporately. There are caveats to these findings, not the least of which is that our measures of CT activity are rather aggregated and cannot fully capture intelligence interventions that reduce the number of attacks brought to fruition, thus also reducing the total fatalities. This issue affects our finding that killing of PIRA members reduces body counts. However, this issue does not affect the finding that killing of civilians by counterterrorism forces leads to increased violence—if anything, our findings underestimate the increase in fatalities after CT forces kill civilians. Together, the results may help inform both policy and operational decision making.
At the policy level, the results show the negative impact likely to occur when nonaligned civilians are killed in the course of counterterrorism operations. Such events embolden terrorist organizations to strike back, usually in an equally indiscriminate fashion.
Even more so, the results suggest that when organizations do decide to strike back in retaliation, it is likely to be at the local level, a finding that ) and ) also found in relation to insurgent activities in Iraq. Although the targeted killing of PIRA members reduces a brigade’s ability to kill within a given year, there is no data available to suggest whether such events also lead to an increase in constituency support, and future recruits for the organization that may later breathe life into a depleted subunit. Moreover, targeted killings may even have the perverse effect of making civilian casualties more likely if the net result is to reduce the skill level of the unit (though further research is needed to confirm this inference). The results also suggest that although PIRA can be described as a coherent, hierarchical organization, the variance among its subunits in terms of composition, capabilities, and targeting policies requires nuanced counterterrorism policies—policies that are tailored to the local subunit’s capacity for lethal activities. The results also hold much promise for aggregate level risk assessment. While there has been much theorizing about the structure of terrorist organizations, our results indicate that perhaps we should be more concerned with the composition and qualities inherent within a network of subunits. Those subunits with a higher number of individuals with professional skills relevant to bomb making more often caused casualties, and those casualties are more likely to be among high-value targets rather than civilians.
Such findings may aid in decisions concerning what segments of a terrorist network should be prioritized for immediate postevent investigation and intelligence gathering. Finally, we recognize that findings are not directly generalizable: we focused here upon one terrorist organization.
Generalizations to other groups may be difficult to make. That said, we believe the logic behind the relationship between counterterrorism killings and the lethality of units and subunits may apply more broadly. Killing those whom the terrorist organization claims to represent is likely to encourage retaliation in the form of indiscriminate violence against civilians for a number of reasons elaborated upon above, whereas killing members of the group is likely to lead (at least in the short run) to reductions in the group’s capacity to striking back. In terms of subunit composition, generalizations are more difficult. Higher levels of skilled bomb makers within PIRA brigades led to both a higher likelihood of high-value targets being killed and civilians being spared—both of which were long-standing strategic policies of PIRA. Not every terrorist organization resembles PIRA in this regard, with many being far less reluctant to kill civilians. We might therefore expect that the more technical expertise within any given subunit in any terrorist organization, the closer that subunits fatality rates will mirror the organization’s strategic logic as a whole.
1.We thank our anonymous reviewers for pointing out this key issue related to the very use of the term terrorism and the conundrums that any discussion of targeting cause. 2.The same is also true for shooting attacks. For example, a sniper would need more training than a spree shooter. Despite this, we treat all shooting attacks equally for the purposes of this study. Further coding effort is planned for future research endeavors to test whether different factors help drive lethal and complex shootings versus lethal and noncomplex shootings. 3.We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue. Authors’ Note: The data collection for this project was undertaken at International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests: The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding: The author (s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The work presented in this project was supported by the Office of Naval Research under Grant #N00014-09-1-0667.